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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

NFIB-9.2/60
13 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, National Foreign
Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) Policy [redacted]

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1. [redacted] The attached memorandum from the Chairman
is forwarded for your consideration.

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2. [redacted] We are tentatively proposing 14 March as
the date for NFIB to address the general subject of
security of sensitive compartmented information. The
meeting is likely to focus on, but need not be limited
to, discussion of:

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- a. The proposed DCID on Compartmentation;
- b. Administrative procedures for handling
and controlling compartmented data;
- c. Policy on travel and assignment of persons
with compartmented access;
- d. Proposed DCID 1/16 on Computer Security.

You are invited to forward to the Executive Secretary in
advance of the meeting any general comments on the subject
of compartmented information policy which you have not
already made on one of the specific topics.

[redacted]
Walter Elder

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Attachment: a/s

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[redacted]
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Attachment
NFIB-9.2/60

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

9 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Stansfield Turner
ChairmanSUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Policy

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REFERENCES: A. NFIB-9.2/59, dated 12 July 1977
B. NFIB-M-703, dated 25 September 1975

1. After reviewing the Security Task Force Report on the cases, I instituted a number of actions aimed at improving security of sensitive compartmented information. My objective was to review current security practices and institute more stringent security controls. Over the past several months, specific problems have been identified and new security procedures have been instituted to correct them. This memorandum reviews this activity and recommends additional steps to further improve protection of sensitive information.

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2. Several important actions have been taken to tighten industrial security. The industrial security program of the CIA has been bolstered by the addition of new industrial security officer positions. A program to conduct periodic unannounced security surveys and inspections of contract facilities has been implemented. A new procedure has been instituted that requires the presence of two individuals in sensitive areas such as the communications center and document control sections at industrial facilities. Action also has been taken to emphasize supervisory responsibilities aimed at identifying and dealing with personnel problems before they become security problems. I have asked for a comprehensive counterintelligence assessment to determine what additional steps should be taken in the industrial arena to tighten security in the face of the Soviet threat. NFIB principals should evaluate their own industrial security programs to assess their adequacy and effectiveness.

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3. One major area of emphasis in the security review has been the management of sensitive compartmented information programs. Reviews by the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX have indicated that the present procedures for accounting for personnel cleared for the various compartmented programs are inadequate, and that a concerted effort to provide centralized management is required. Work is underway in the Security Committee to develop a computerized management program designed to meet the needs of all agencies in the Intelligence Community. I will be advising the Board further on this program, its implications, and costs.

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SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Policy ☐

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4. ☐ Last summer I placed a freeze on the number of personnel having access to special compartmented information by requiring that personnel coming into the system would be matched by personnel being debriefed. The objective was to stabilize the numbers of persons having access to SCI and to focus Community attention on the fact that the principle of need-to-know must be practiced. This procedure has caused some problems, but overall it has had a salutary effect. The number of personnel cleared for access to sensitive information has stabilized. More importantly, requests for new clearances have been given a more thorough scrub at all stages in the approval process. While I am aware that briefing personnel into compartmented programs facilitates security by making them conscious of the sensitivity of the information made available to them, I am resolved to continue this stabilization and eventually show a downward trend in the number of personnel cleared. Consequently, continued compliance with the principle of one in, one out is required. There will be instances when the one in, one out concept will not be practical, for example, when new programs are initiated. Such exceptions will be considered on a case-by-case basis and subject to my ultimate approval.

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* 5. ☐ The Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX are continuing to pursue the question of what materials and information now controlled in the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE systems may be decompartmented so as to reduce the numbers of SCI access approvals.

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6. ☐ While we have made some progress in improving security of sensitive information, considerably more remains to be done. I encourage each NFIB Principal to offer suggestions they may have on ways to improve the overall security of sensitive compartmented information. I intend to schedule an NFIB meeting to discuss this general subject soon.

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STANSFIELD TURNER**SECRET**